For the Guardian, that aspect is inconsequential we want to provide anonymity for our users, not ourselves. For some hosts, who wish to remain anonymous, location-hiding is the primary reason for using an Onion service. This opens the door to potential man-in-the-middle attacks and also reveals the location of the hosting server to the connecting server via its IP address. The final communication between the hosting server and the server attempting to connect (whether it’s your own computer or a Tor exit node) uses regular TCP/IP to route packets. Onion servicesĪccessing a website on the “clearnet” (the regular internet), even using Tor, relies on domain name resolution and IP-address-identified servers where the website is hosted. If you’d like to browse the Onion service, you can visit while using the Tor browser. In this article we’ll share these challenges and our approach. But with a relatively unfamiliar technology, which doesn’t align perfectly with many of our common tools and patterns, we faced some different challenges. Onion services go a step further, ensuring the end-to-end communication is conducted entirely over the Tor network (more on this in the next section.)Īs always in Guardian product and engineering, our ambition is to rapidly deliver something of value to our readers, learn from any feedback and iterate over time. This means users can bypass censorship in parts of the world where access to independent news might be difficult or if certain websites and services are banned. Tor also makes it harder for internet service providers to identify what their users are accessing. The Tor network helps conceal its users’ locations, which makes tracking their internet activity much more difficult. Guardian readers have always been able to access over Tor using tools such as the Tor Browser. A few months ago we wanted to explore making the Guardian’s website available as a Tor Onion service, a service that can only be accessed over the Tor network.
0 kommentar(er)
